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
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

ENEMY SUPPLY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA THROUGH 14 JUNE

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June 1970



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia Through 14 June

Introduction

This memorandum is the fourth in a series of weekly updates of an Intelligence Memorandum on enemy supply losses in Cambodia.* The analysis is based on field reporting of the first 46 days of Allied ground actions in Cambodia. The assessment of supply losses remains tentative until the completion of current operations and the receipt of adjusted data from the field.

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Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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25X1

Supply Losses

1. From 30 April through 14 June the enemy lost about 8,840 short tons of food, weapons and equipment, and ammunition in Cambodia as indicated in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons</u>
Class I (food)	6,454
Classes II and IV (weapons and equipment)	308 <u>a/</u>
Class V (ammunition)	2,076
<i>Total</i>	<i>8,838</i>

a. Including 164 tons of clothing, medical supplies, communications and personal equipment, and explosives other than ammunition (last week these supplies totaled 121 tons). Excluding an estimate of 964 tons of vehicles and 19 tons of petroleum. These categories were not included in our calculation and have been excluded in this analysis in order to provide comparability of data in making judgments on the drawdown of stockpiles.

The losses include 17,721 individual weapons, 2,330 crew-served weapons, 9.3 million rifle rounds, about 4.0 million machinegun rounds, about 62,000 mortar rounds, and about 1,900 large rocket rounds. In addition, 396 vehicles have been captured.

Trends in Supply Losses

2. During the week ending 14 June, 297 tons of food, weapons, and ammunition were uncovered by Allied operations, approximately 3% of the total uncovered since operations began on 30 April. This represents a decrease from the daily rate of supply seizures in the previous three weeks -- 42 tons compared with 186 tons -- and reflects the downward trend which has been noted as the operations have continued. Average daily supply

losses for representative periods are shown in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons per Day</u>		
	<u>30 Apr-17 May</u>	<u>18 May-7 Jun</u>	<u>8-14 Jun</u>
Food	184	143	22
Weapons	4	3	2
Ammunition	62	40	18
<i>Total</i>	<i>250</i>	<i>186</i>	<i>42</i>

3. Geographically, losses in Base Area 351 accounted for nearly all of the food losses sustained last week. Additional weapons caches uncovered in the Parrot's Beak (Base Areas 706/367), the Fishhook (Base Area 352), and Base Areas 351 and 704 represented more than 98% of the captures of enemy weapons last week. Ammunition losses were heaviest in the Parrot's Beak, the Fishhook, and Base Area 351, the total captured there representing 94% of the total. No operations were terminated during the past week.

4. As observed in the last weekly report, the amount of supplies being uncovered confirms our earlier judgments that the enemy stockpiles would be at the high end of the calculated ranges, if not higher. The data support this judgment with the possible exception of the estimated stockpiles of Class II and IV supplies (weapons and equipment) which are being uncovered in apparently relatively low amounts. This anomaly suggests that this category of supplies may possibly be stockpiled at significantly lower levels than indicated in the tabulation below. To reflect this uncertainty, the stockpile figures for weapons and equipment continue to show a broad range. The figures for the other categories of supply are those of the high end of the range of previously published figures.

5. Enemy losses in Cambodia compared with our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia are given in the tabulation below:

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>		<u>Losses as a Percent of Estimated Enemy Stockpiles</u>
	<u>Estimated Enemy Stockpiles in Cambodia Apr 1970</u>	<u>Enemy Losses in Cambodia 30 Apr-14 Jun</u>	
Food	10,370	6,454	62
Weapons and equipment	1,600-2,700	308	11-19
Ammunition	2,255	2,076	92

6. Food losses are currently 62% of the stockpiles estimated to have been in Cambodia at the beginning of Allied operations, while weapons losses are 11% to 19% and ammunition losses are 92%. Weapons losses in Cambodia are equal to 32% of enemy weapons losses in South Vietnam last year. If the enemy regards these weapons losses in Cambodia as serious, it can be expected that infiltrators will begin carrying their own arms in the near future. In 1968 and 1969, most infiltrators did not carry arms during their movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam, but were given weapons after arriving in the base areas along the Cambodian - South Vietnamese border.

7. Ammunition losses in South Vietnam by type for 1969 are compared with losses to date in Cambodia in the following tabulation:

	<u>South Vietnam (1969)</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Cambodia/ South Vietnam (Percent)</u>
Small arms	12,403,000	9,303,000	75
Large rockets	4,000	1,900	48
Small rockets	70,000	39,000	56
Mortars	190,000	62,000	33
Grenades	149,000	53,000	36
Recoilless rifles	17,300	27,000	156

Losses of ammunition for recoilless rifles have been exceptionally high and are currently 156% of

comparable losses in South Vietnam last year. Other losses of ammunition have ranged between 33% and 75% of the comparable losses in South Vietnam last year.

Resupply Problems

8. An enemy document captured in the Fishhook area and dated 25 May 1970 indicates that a battalion of the 141st Regiment was experiencing food, drug, and ammunition shortages as a result of Allied operations in Cambodia. Another document captured in the same area and dated 29 May states that food supplies were low in an unidentified unit located at the former base camp of the Military Intelligence Office of COSVN because of continued Allied operations in the area. The morale of the men reportedly was low because of the lack of food. Despite this type of report on shortages of supplies, the pace and wide scope of enemy activity in Cambodia makes it clear that his access to supply sources has not been critically limited.

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Summary

15. US and South Vietnamese forces have captured about 8,840 tons of supplies during the first 46 days of operations in Cambodia. About 73% of enemy losses consist of food, about 23% ammunition, and the remainder weapons and equipment. The rate of supply captures continued to decline this past week from an average of 250 short tons daily during 30 April-17 May to 186 short tons per day during

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18 May-7 June and to about 42 short tons daily during 8-14 June.

16. Food losses are currently about 62% of estimated stockpiles, and ammunition losses are about 92% of the estimated stocks in Cambodia. Losses of weapons and equipment are currently between 11% and 19% of the estimated stocks.

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On balance, although the route structure is being maintained and supplies are moving, the Communists are probably not satisfied with their transportation effort thus far in June.

Cumulative Results of US and ARVN Operations in Cambodia
(as of 14 June 2000 Hours EDT)

Supply Item	Parrot's Beak	Fishhook	Base Areas					Terminated Operations <u>a/</u>	Total
			740	351	350	704/709	704		
Individual weapons	1,827	4,652	586	2,449	318	2,672	1,822	3,395	17,721 <u>b/</u>
Crew-served weapons	467	719	133	360 <u>c/</u>	31	144	35	441	2,330 <u>b/</u>
Rice (tons)	866	2,908 <u>d/</u>	411	1,220	68	38	17	926	6,454
Vehicles	25	234	22	99	2	8	0	6	396
Ammunition (tons)	484	381	20	972	25	25	25	144 <u>e/</u>	2,076

a. Terminated operations include Rock Crusher IV, Tia Chop (Base Area 702), Binh Tay I (Base Area 702), Binh Tay II (Base Area 701), and Cuu Long II (Base Area 704).

b. Represents the loss of about 144 tons of arms.

c. Revised downward from 410 weapons last week because of field adjustment of the data.

d. Revised downward from 2,938 tons last week because of field adjustment of the data.


e. Revised downward from 204 tons last week because of field adjustment of the data.

VC/NVA Base Areas Along Cambodian Border



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